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Abstract: The financial sector is always looking for new services delivery platforms 
to improve customer confidence and satisfaction.   To achieve this, the banking service 
delivery platform must provide end-to-end security to safeguard the financial 
information exchanged between the bank and the customer.  Today a number of banks 
offer mobile banking service to their customers. However, still banks have been 
adopting the generic user authentication systems that were developed for the desktop 
environment based on two-factor authentication with a number of user intrusive 
activities.  This paper presents a novel authentication and authorization framework for 
secure mobile banking applications based on the user SIM and mobile credentials.  
 




1   Introduction 
 
The wide penetrations of mobile phone usage and the availability of more powerful 
mobile handsets and network bandwidth have  made mobile devices an attractive 
candidate for value added services.  Today mobile users can carry out basic banking 
transactions such as transfer money, check balances or pay a bill or statement. Mobile 
banking services will be a value added service for mobile users due to the fact that the 
users can carry out banking from anywhere anytime at their convenience.   It also 
gives the opportunity for people who do not have broadband connectivity to carry out 
mobile banking.  According to the Juniper Research, by the end of 2011 more than 
150 million subscribers worldwide will have used mobile banking services and this 
represents a growth of more than three fold since 2008 [1]. 
However, security is one of the main areas of concern when introducing banking 
services in mobile devices.  During the recent past there has been a number of mobile 
banking solutions emerged in the market place that are complex and hence have 
slowed the adoption. This paper will review the existing mobile banking solutions and 









The mobile banking association has recently highlighted the following main 
security issues that should be addressed in order to encourage the adoption of mobile 
banking [2]. 
(1)  Data transmission must be secured: for the confidentiality, the connection 
between the bank and the device should be encrypted. 
(2)  Application and data access must be controlled: before users can receive 
any sensitive information related to their bank accounts, a certain degree of 
verification must be completed. 
(3)  Data integrity must be provided: Any critical data to the mobile phone 
must be protected against unauthorized modification. 
(4)  Loss of device must have limited impact: The mobile banking service 





2   Mobile Banking 
 
Mobile banking is a term used for performing online banking services such as money 
transactions, view account balance, etc using a mobile device such as a mobile phone. 
Mobile banking today is most often performed using Short Message Service (SMS) 
communication or the Mobile Internet but can also use special programs called mobile 
applications downloaded onto the mobile device. We did a comparative study on 
security features in different banking applications in UK, USA and Asia. We have 
identified three main techniques in mobile banking and security features associated 
with each technique. 
SMS Banking: The short message services in the mobile network are used to 
communicate between the mobile user and the bank. This is one of the most popular 
techniques and SMS banking offers features like check account balance, do micro 
payments and view mini statements. The user is registered with the bank using the 
mobile phone number and a  password or PIN  and those parameters are used to 
authenticate the user. The bank provides a set of SMS codes for different banking 
functions (e.g.  „bank_balance  to  enquire the  bank balance) or  user  has  to  send 
messages to different destination numbers for different services. Memorizing different 
SMS codes for different banking functions is cumbersome to the mobile users and 
there is no nationally or internationally accepted standard code of practice available 
to-date. 
WAP-GPRS: Wireless application protocol (WAP) browser provides all the basic 
services of a web browser but simplified for a mobile phone. WAP banking in other 
terms is  mobile Internet banking such as  mobile users access banking websites 
designed to be accessed from mobile phones. This mobile banking would require all 
or a part of the authentication credentials used in Internet banking. Mostly, the users 
have to enter the username, password and account number. The extra security is added 
by some banks with introducing a One Time Password service. The bank issues a 
password that is valid for just single login or single transaction. So every time when 
user makes a new transaction the One Time Password is sent through SMS to the 








However, entering all the security parameters using a mobile phone with restricted 
key pad (e.g. most of the mobile phones represent 4 letters by a single key in the key 
pad.) is not a user-friendly authentication method in mobile banking. 
Mobile Application based Banking: Most banks are in the process of adopting 
this technology. The banking application is downloaded to the mobile device and then 
user is authenticated using username and password technique and the mobile number 
is used for the user identification in some of the existing applications. However, still 
the user entered password is required by the bank for the user authentication. This 
password  is  recommended  to  be  strong  characters  to  prevent  security  attacks. 
Meanwhile, Interactive Voice Response (IVR) calls are implemented in the mobile 
banking platform by some of the banks to improve the security features. 
 
The Bank of America provides the mobile banking to their customers and it has 
three levels of security such as Online ID is  entered by the  user (Online ID is 
considered as a secure information), the site key is sent by the bank to the mobile 
device and it is identified by the mobile user and finally password is entered by the 
user. Barclays bank in the United Kingdom provides a WAP based mobile banking 
platform and users have to enter the complete login details such as username, 
membership number, passcode and memorable name from the mobile device. The 
HSBC and NatWest banks in  the UK provide mobile application based banking 
services. The application is installed onto the mobile device and security is established 
using the phone number and the password. The HDFC bank in India provides WAP 
and  SMS  based  mobile  banking  services.  However,  they  do  not  provide  more 
sensitive functions such as money transactions and the security is implemented using 
a user PIN. 
Most of the mobile banking services inherit user authentication using one or more 
combinations of username, password, PIN, phone number and IVR calls [3]. 
Meanwhile, an extra PIN or password based authentication is required to authorize 
money transactions in mobile banking. However, according to the article [4], the 
number of user inputs to the mobile application using the mobile key pad should be 
minimized since it should be convenient for users to operate while on the move. 
Clarke and Furnell [5] presented security weaknesses in PIN and other user intrusive 
authentication systems in mobile devices. They highlighted the importance of non- 
user intrusive authentication methods for sensitive service access at mobile devices. 
Merita Bank in Finland did a case study in mobile banking and they used the WAP 
technology with the username and password based authentication. The final outcome 
of the report was to setup a public key infrastructure in the mobile device to 
authenticate the mobile users to the banking services [3]. Horn G. et al. [6] evaluated 
the  design of public key based protocols suitable for  applications in  3G  mobile 
systems. The protocols were considered for the authentication of a mobile user to 
value-added   financial   services.   However,   special   Wireless   Identity   Module 
technology (WIM) is required in the mobile device or in the smart card to store long 
term secret keys in a mobile device [7]. Meanwhile, Dodis et al. [8] highlighted 
threats to cryptography when installing a private key in a device and especially when 
a user carries the mobile device which allows remote access from public or foreign 
domains. They recommended having a  key as  an  output from a  combination of 









The researches have investigated the use of mobile operator issued SIM card as an 
authentication unit for mobile banking. The SIM card is used by the mobile operator 
to identify the subscriber but the same SIM card was used for mobile banking by 
Radiomobil (today TMobile Czech) together with several Czech banks. These mobile 
SIM cards were specifically developed since then for mobile banking.  Besides the 
GSM credentials they contained a collection of credentials (access keys) for mobile 
banking [9]. This security approach is not presently used due to the complexity of key 
management.  CamWebSIM [10] is the platform for a variety of identification and 
security solutions. It is based on Windows for SmartCard and its integrated SIM 
functionality is combined with a small HTTP server on the card. By making the SIM 
accessible over HTTP, the phone and the SIM becomes a personal security server on 
the Internet. Meanwhile as specified in [11], the SIM can be used to generate a secure 
verifiable electronic consent of the mobile user using the electronic signature on SIM- 
created credentials that may contain information about time, intent and recipient. 
The security framework proposed in this paper uses the SIM based authentication 
at the mobile operator to authenticate the mobile users to the mobile banking services. 
Then identity and attribute (parameter) based key generation functionality is proposed 
to authorize more sensitive banking services at the mobile device. The combination of 
SIM authentication and parameter based authorization generates a simple security 




3   Architecture 
 
The mobile service environment has three main actors such as the consumer, mobile 
operator and the bank. The consumer is the mobile user with a mobile device and the 
mobile device has a SIM card connected to a mobile network. The proposed security 
framework allows mobile users to use the SIM based authentication mechanisms at 
the bank to access the mobile banking services. The authentication functionality is 
based on Federated Identity Management (FIM) technologies with the standard 3G 
authentication techniques [12] at the mobile operator. The FIM is an extended version 
of the Single-Sign-On (SSO) technique and it enables a single authentication system 
to be shared across multiple trust domains. The mobile operator and the bank are in 
two trust domains but the user authentication is linked using the FIM technology. This 
proposed environment is implemented based on the guidelines of Liberty Identity 
Federation Framework (ID-FF) [13]. The mobile users and the bank are connected to 
the mobile operator to access the outsourced SIM based credentials for authentication 

















The implementation of security framework for mobile banking is based on Web 
service architecture such as; 
• The mobile device has an over-the-air installed application that uses the SIM 
card as one of its security elements. This application is named as the Security 
Capsule. 
• The  banking  services  content  is  provided  by  the  services  provider  in 
accordance with the Web services standard over the SOAP messaging. 
•     The mobile operator provides the authentication service using the Generic 
Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA) architecture of Generic Authentication 
Architecture (GAA) as specified by the 3GPP specification [12], and the 
bank establishes a trust relationship with the mobile operator and implements 
the Federated Identity Management technology. 
 
The banking services are available to mobile users from the bank and the service 
must be capable of being set-up using over-the-air techniques. The actors interface to 
the system using the standard and the internationally agreed protocols such as SOAP 
and HTTP over the Internet or mobile network. 
 
The Security Capsule is a mobile application and it establishes the mobile device 
communication with the bank. The bank uniquely identifies the mobile device for 
authentication and  authorization before  the  service  delivery  and  the  bank  issued 
security  tokens  to  the  Security  Capsule  to  confirm the  valid  authentication and 
authorization activities at the mobile device. The unique identity is derived in the 
Security Capsule using the logical and physical identity parameters at the mobile 
device. Meanwhile, the Security Capsule maintains the key credentials for the 
authentication at the mobile operator and the bank. The unique identity and key 
credentials are used to present the final user authorization to access services. The user 
authorization is performed by generating a cryptographic key with different input 
parameters. Meanwhile, the Security Capsule utilizes and verifies the security tokens 
and secure messages during the registration and authentication with the bank. 
 
The novel key generation process at the Security Capsule enables a new way of 
mobile banking framework without consuming number of user inputs for the security 
validation. The Security Capsule uses the physical and logical identities and key 
credentials at the mobile device as inputs. Therefore, the key generation process 
automatically guarantees and verifies the mobile user identity and authentication to 
access banking services. The cryptographic key will not be generated unless relevant 
identities are presented else the authentication is unsuccessful. The following are the 
necessary credentials and identity parameters for the key generation process. 
• IMPI (IP Multimedia Private Identity): The mobile operator assigned identity 
for the mobile user. This identity is stored in the USIM of the mobile device. 
• IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity): The unique identity of the 
mobile device and this is issued by the mobile device manufacturer. 
•     UID: The identity provider issued unique identity for the security capsule. 
The UID is inserted into the source code of the Security Capsule and it cant 
be retrieved by external parties. The UID is an alphanumeric value in the 








• Token Key: This cryptographic key is issued by the bank as a result of 
successful mobile user authentication and authorization. 
 
The key generation using the above functions will enable SIM dependent, mobile 
device dependent, mobile user dependent and bank authentication dependent data 




4   Security Protocol Design 
 
The bank has the main role in the security framework such as registering, identifying, 
authenticating and  authorizing mobile users to  the  banking services. The  mobile 
users SIM deployed in mobile device with the Security Capsule acts as an 
authentication authority to the bank. The identification and authentication information 
about the mobile user are exchanged from the mobile operator to the bank. 
 
Figure  2  presents  the  main  communication links  between  the  bank,  mobile 
operator and mobile user and our mobile banking framework consists of 3 main stages 
such as: 
Registration: a  mobile user  registers with the  bank  for  mobile banking 
services. The mobile user downloads the security capsule and then shares some secret 
credential information with the bank for the authentication.  The mobile user registers 
for the mobile banking services by downloading the Security Capsule from the bank. 
The Security Capsule is downloaded and installed to the mobile device using over - 
the-air technique of the mobile network. It contains a unique identification number 
(UID) and it is used to identify the mobile user at the identity provider. The security 
capsule sends a registration acknowledgement to the bank after the successful 
installation. The registration acknowledgement consists of the UID and identification 
parameters at the mobile handset. 
Authentication:  the  mobile  user  authenticates  with  the  bank  to  access 
services on the bank account. The secret credentials are exchanged and parties are 
mutually authenticated with each other. The mobile device uses the Bootstrapping 
Server Function at the mobile operator to create the application layer credentials. The 
generation of the application layer credentials is presented by the messages (1) and (2) 
in Figure 2. The B-TID is a mobile operator generated reference to the application 
layer credentials. These credentials are then shared with the bank according to the 
GBA of GAA [35]. The messages (3) and (4) in Figure 2 are referred to the GAA 
function between the mobile operator and the bank. The knowledge of the shared 
secret mutually authenticates the mobile user and the bank to the mobile banking 
framework as shown in messages (5) and (6) in Figure 2. The bank uses its public key 
certificate to authenticate with the mobile user and Security Capsule generated shared 
key is used for the secure communication after the authentication. 
Authorization: this is an extended security feature in mobile banking and 
bank would use the authorization before any financially valuable transactions. For an 








change personal information, etc. These activities have to be authorized with special 




Figure 2: Communication links 
 
The detailed description of the security protocol in the  banking framework is 




4.1   Registration 
 
The mobile user downloads the security capsule to the mobile device for mobile 
banking services. The capsule can be downloaded either by visiting the WAP web site 
of the bank using a WAP browser in the mobile device or by clicking on the Security 
Capsule download link sent as a text message. The Security Capsule is downloaded 
using over-the-air or  wired  techniques. The  following are  the  main steps in  the 
registration process and the steps are presented in Figure 3. 
(1)  The mobile device requests to download security capsule. (2)  
The security capsule is downloaded onto the mobile device. 
(3)  The mobile user verifies the authentication of the bank and the integrity of 
the downloaded Security Capsule using the following steps. These steps are 
carried out prior to the Security Capsule installation process. 
•     The public key certificate of the bank is used to authenticate the bank. 
• The calculated hash value of the Security Capsule binary installation is 








integrity. The  hash  value is  signed  using the  banks  private  key to 
present the authentication. 
(4) The Security Capsule is installed into the mobile device as a mobile 
application. The downloaded Security Capsule is uniquely identified using 
the UID.  The UID is used to present the Security Capsule identification to 




Figure 3: Registration Process 
 
(5)  The  Security Capsule executes the  bootstrapping function at  the  mobile 
operator. 
(6)  The execution of Bootstrapping function will generate a new shared secret 
key (Ks) between the mobile device and the mobile operator. The Ks is 
generated in the device and mobile operator sends the B-TID as a reference 
to the shared secret key (Ks). 
(7)  The Security Capsule accesses the IMPI and IMEI values from the mobile 
device and it generates the KIMPI and KIMEI using an inbuilt hash function. 
HASH ( IMPI ) = KIMPI 
HASH ( IMEI ) = KIMEI 
B-TID, KIMPI and KIMEI are transmitted to the bank by encrypting them using 
the banks public key. 
(8)  The bank sends the B-TID to the mobile operator and requests the shared 
secret key (Ks). 
(9)  The mobile operator sends the shared secret key (Ks) to the bank. 
(10) The bank generates a random challenge using the Ks and a random number. 
The random challenge is sent to the security capsule and it is used to validate 
the mobile users ownership to the B-TID and Ks. 
(11) The Security Capsule generates the Challenge Response using the Ks and 








4.2   Authentication 
 
The authentication phase starts when the user wants to login to the mobile banking 
service. The login function in the Security Capsule is initiated by the user. The 
following  are  the  main  steps  in  the  authentication  process  and  the  steps  are 




Figure 4: Authentication Process 
 
(1)  The Security Capsule accesses the present B-TID in the mobile device and 
sends the UID and the B-TID to the bank. If the B-TID is not available then 
Bootstrapping function is executed at the mobile operator. The B-TID and 
the UID are encrypted using the banks public key. 
(2)  The bank sends the B-TID to the mobile operator to obtain the relevant Ks 
for the communication. 
(3)  The mobile operator checks the B-TID and send the associated Ks to the 
bank 
(4)   The bank generates a random challenge using the Ks and a random number. 
The random challenge is sent to the Security Capsule and the challenge is 
used to validate the mobile users ownership to the B-TID and the Ks. 
(5)  The Security Capsule generated the Challenge Response using the Ks and 
returns  the  Challenge  Response  to  the  bank.  Meanwhile,  the  Security 
Capsule generates session key (tsk) and sends it to the bank. This session key 
is  used  for  all  the  future  communication  with  the  bank.  The  complete 
message to the bank is encrypted using the banks public key. 
(6)  At this stage, the Security Capsule and the bank are mutually authenticated to 
each other. The bank uses the Ks knowledge at the Security Capsule to 
authenticate the Security Capsule. The B-TID and the UID are encrypted 
using the public key of the bank by the Security Capsule. The knowledge of 
the banks private key at the bank is used to authenticate the bank to the 
Security capsule. The Service Token is generated by the bank and the token 
is sent to the Security Capsule as the authentication confirmation. Service 













4.3   Authorization 
 
The authorization phase is required when a mobile user wants to access or execute 
more sensitive activities. The user authorization is presented to the bank by generating 
the Data Key at the Security Capsule. The Data Key is generated using a number of 
identity and credential parameters at the mobile device. The following are the main 




Figure 5: Authorization Process 
 
(1)  The  user  requests  to  execute  a  sensitive  activity.  The  request  for  the 
execution is transferred to the bank with the Service Token. 
(2)  The bank generates an Execution Token and returns to the Security Capsule. 
The Execution Token is the authorization token for the activity execution. 
The bank issues the Execution Token based on the user access privileges 
evaluation at the bank. 
(3)  The bank generates the Data Key and sends the Execution Challenge to the 
Security Capsule. The Data Key generation process at the bank is explained 
in Section 4. The Execution Challenge is encrypted using the Data Key. The 
Execution Challenge is  generated to verify the successful end-user level 
authorization. 
(4)  The  Security  Capsule  generates  the  Data  Key  and  then  generates  the 
Execution Challenge Response using the Data Key. The Execution Challenge 
Response is  sent to  the  bank. The Data  Key generation at  the  Security 
Capsule is explained in Section 4. 
(5)  If the Execution Challenge Response is successfully verified then execution 










5.0   Execution Challenge Response generation 
 
The Security Capsule obtains the request for the Execution Challenge Response from 
the bank and it retrieves relevant Execution Token from the device memory. The Data 
Key is generated as the initial step and then the Execution Challenge Response will be 
generated. The following are the Data Key generation steps at the security capsule. 
 
(1)  Validates the Execution Token integrity and the freshness. If the token is not 
valid then it is deleted from the Security Capsule and a new token is 
requested from the bank. 
• The XML signature of the token is verified with the banks public key 
certificate for the token integrity and authorization. 
• The timestamp of the token and the token lifetime are compared with the 
present timestamp from the bank. 
(2)  The Security Capsule obtains the IMPI and IMEI from the mobile device and 
the UID from the internal data storage. 
(3)  The Data Key for the Execution Challenge Response generation is generated 
using the hash function based key generation algorithm as shown in Figure 2. 












(4)  The Security Capsule generates the Execution Challenge Response using the 
Data Key and the Execution Challenge as shown in the below function. Then 
Data key is permanently deleted from the device memory after the process. 
 
Function Execution Challenge Res (Data Key, Execution Challenge) = Execution Challenge 
Response 
 
The Data Key generation and Execution Challenge Response generation functions are 








6   Conclusion & discussions 
 
The research novelty discussed in this paper leads to a standard secure mobile banking 
framework for mobile users to access their banking services from anywhere. The 
present mobile banking solutions require number of user intrusive activities during the 
authentication but  our  solution presents effective and  user-friendly authentication 
solution for mobile devices. 
We have evaluated our framework using the Scyther  model checking security 
protocol verification tool  [16].  Scyther  is  an  automatic  push-button tool  for  the 
verification and falsification of security protocols. The secure banking protocol is 
written using the SPDL (Security Protocol Description Language) and then validated 
using “Automatic claim” and “Verification claim” procedures in the Scyther tool.  We 
have developed a proof of concept prototype for the evaluation.  The prototype was 








memory attacks, phishing attacks, source substitution attack, time-memory trade-off 
attack, codebook attack and known key attack. 
A number of user intrusive activities for the authentication and authorization in the 
current mobile banking frameworks are one of the major drawbacks for users on the 
present authentication services for mobile banking and hence are not suitable for users 
to use at anywhere. However, the user authentication and authorization in our model 
is done using non-intrusive methods and hence user inputs are not required for the 
process. The proposed model will improve the efficiency and the usability of the 
mobile banking services. However, an extra 4 digit user PIN is recommended to 
prevent SIM cloning and mobile user impersonation attacks. 
Using the parameter based access control techniques the banks will be able to 
introduced more identities and attributes to the key generation process. This will lead 
to different authorization levels based on the sensitive nature of the banking data 
involved in each transaction.
 
Finally, the proposed mobile banking security framework will be an effective and 
secure solution for present mobile banking applications. The solution will present 
novel secure authentication and authorization mechanisms to improve the customer 
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